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The Museum Time Bomb: Overbuilt, Overtraded,
Overdrawn
James M. Bradburne
Introduction
The past three decades have seen
a huge museum building boom in Western Europe and America. Combined
with an emphasis on so-called “blockbuster” exhibitions, museums are
popular as never before. Visitors stand in queues for hours in order
to pass a few minutes shuffling in front of old master paintings or
experience an epiphany in a seconds-long encounter with the Impressionists,
and some museums have been obliged to stay open “round the clock” to
meet the demand. More than ever, museum attendance is seen as an indispensable
feature in a modern lifestyle. The statistics reflect the giddy heights
to which the numbers of museum visits have soared, and overall the number
of people visiting museums has increased substantially during the past
decade.
Nevertheless, there are signs that
these rosy statistics mask a troubling decline in visits to middle-aged,
middle-sized institutions, which are often unable to generate the exhibitions
said to be necessary to keep the visitor’s appetite for novelty whetted.
Moreover, regardless of size or location, there are widespread problems
caused by falling museum income as the public sector reduces its commitment
to museums, and the private sector fails to support core museum activities.
When funding is available, it is
often a one-time investment linked to new museum building—a “poison
pill” that leaves museums with higher future operating costs but no
guarantee of future revenue. In Britain, where lottery funds were extensively
used to fuel the museum building craze, the first of the lottery-funded
projects are in financial trouble already, and some are already considering
closing. There is a time bomb in making as scores of new museum projects
are poised to go bankrupt during the coming decades. Their collapse
will put a massive burden on the public purse if they are to be saved,
or expose them and the communities that they support to major disruptions
as they are closed or converted to new uses. What is happening to the
museum field? Is the museum boom sustainable? Can museums continue to
fulfill their mission and still survive in a time when public and private
priorities are changing rapidly?
Since its earliest history, in
addition to its role as the collector and preserver of material culture,
the museum has been seen to perform two other significant roles, that
of education, and that of leisure. The importance of these roles has
varied significantly in emphasis over the past two centuries, and both
models have an excellent pedigree. However, given the polarization of
these two roles in the years after WWII, arguments for funding have
often been linked to the degree to which the museum delivers value as
education or as leisure activity.
In principle, public money—the
widow’s taxes—supports public education, while the private sector—most
commonly the individual user—pays for private pleasure. Traditionally
in Europe the museum has been funded almost entirely from the public
purse as a scholarly resource on the one hand (akin to support for the
university as a site for the production of new knowledge) and as a site
of public education on the other. In America, where the bias has been
towards private or charitable funding, the museum has been financed
primarily as a leisure activity, a public platform for the educated
flâneur. Unfortunately, while the terms leisure and education
remain the same, the definition of the scope and expectations associated
with them has undergone drastic revision in the past forty years. As
a consequence, the museums are caught rather uncomfortably on the sharp
horns of a funding dilemma.
On the one hand, museums that have
pursued their traditional educational mission have found that the education
they are now expected to provide is increasingly “remedial”—directed
at filling gaps in the basic education of an increasingly broad spectrum
of users. Increasingly, public funding for museums is tied to meeting
specific targets aimed at addressing issues of social inclusion. At
the same time, confronted by data that show how limited museums are
in providing primary education, the public purse is questioning its
return on investment—museums are just too expensive to operate for the
relatively brief educational encounter enjoyed (or not) by most users.
The cost per visitor of a four-hour visit per year (if the museum is
lucky) is out of proportion to the results of a similar investment in
the classroom or in the media.
On the other hand, those museums
who followed the call to join the “leisure industry” and provide entertainment—even
“edutainment”—are now also threatened. Public authorities are understandably
reluctant to fund entertainment—in their opinion a frivolous private
experience. In order to increase visitor numbers, and thereby revenue,
museums are forced further and further “down market.” First conceived
as an encyclopedia, the museum has increasingly become a 3-D walkthrough
documentary. From the documentary it is but a short step to the Hollywood-style
blockbuster. At the same time, even blockbuster exhibitions do not benefit
from sufficient economies of scale to enable museums to “sell” the museum
experience at a price the public is willing to pay. The value-for-money
of the museum as entertainment is unfortunately relatively low, while
the costs are substantial. Whereas a Walt Disney visit or a Hollywood
film enjoy economies of scale whereby they can be expected to pay for
themselves from revenue, few museums break even with exhibitions—even
fewer when all the overheads are taken into account.
This paper explores both paths
the museums have followed in the past decades, education and entertainment,
and suggests that they are both dead ends. What is called for is a reassertion
of the core values of the museum, and a reaffirmation of its core competences.
Only then can the appropriate funding model—sufficient and sustainable—be
identified.
The Museum Mission
In an earlier and less complicated
time, Joseph Veach Noble (then Head of Education at the Metropolitan
Museum of Art and later to become President of the American Association
of Museums) wrote that the purpose of the museum is “to collect, to
conserve, to study, to interpret and to exhibit.” These, he said, “are
like the five fingers of a hand, each independent, but united for a
common purpose.”1
If
one defines the museum largely as the first three fingers of the hand,
its history is linked to that of the collection, and the museum has
its roots in the Classical past. The earliest museum of which we can
speak was actually a library: the mousseion of Alexandria, the
institutional sibling of the famous library that flourished three centuries
before Christ. Since the Renaissance, the dominant model of the museum
has been the collection, and the demands of the collection have taken
precedence in the museum’s organization.
If one puts the emphasis on the
last two fingers, the museum’s history can be traced to the late 18th
century. By the end of the 18th century, the political situation was
extremely volatile, and the demands for access to social, political
and cultural machinery found decisive political expression. Following
the French Revolution in 1789, the very existence of private collections
was called into question. Out of the passionate defense of the need
for collections to the Convention of 1793 and 1794, the first modern
museums were born: the Louvre, the Muséum national d’Histoire naturelle,
and the Musée des arts et métiers.
Regardless of which of the fingers
is emphasized, it is clear that much of the museum’s core mission—and
its core values—have to do with preserving the traces of culture over
the very long term. Moreover, since the French Revolution, museums have
been seen as a resource to supplement the formal education system. Now,
forced increasingly to position themselves as exhibition halls, museums
are being exhorted to become an extension of the “leisure industry”—on
the assumption that entertainment, after all, should be self-financing.
Alternatively, museums are being pressured to play an active and activist
role in redressing social and economic inequalities. This repositioning
raises some fundamental questions.
Is The Museum Entertainment?
First of all, is the museum really
part of the “leisure industry?” The assumptions that underlie this assertion
are two-fold. First, that museums have a product, something that is
made in some kind of quasi–industrial process, and second, that as part
of an industry, we are only one of a multitude of other producers of
similar goods—in this case, something called “leisure” or “recreation.”
We thereby unwittingly end up as soulmates with electronic games, swimming,
going to the cinema, and curling up with a good book. I would argue
that it is very difficult to define the museum “product”—is it enjoyment?
Learning? Enlightenment? and even harder to define the process whereby
museums create the product—our objects? Our labels? Our cafés? Is it
all just “leisure?”
Second, if the museum is in fact
competing for the precious discretionary time of the visitor, with whom
is the museum competing and for what? Competition only realistically
can be said to exist if there are limited resources and real choices.
If I have only ten dollars (or Euro), I must choose how to spend it.
The more wealth I have, the less choices come into conflict—the less
they compete. If I can buy a watch, a diamond ring, and fly to New York
for the weekend, where is the competition?
Competition also assumes that products
or services are interchangeable, and are distinguished only by cost,
quality, and occasional intangibles. I can choose between Garrard and
Cartier when I buy a diamond ring—they are in competition. I can choose
to fly to New York with Virgin Atlantic or with Air India—they are in
competition. But when a product or service is irreplaceable, where is
the competition? When a unique Stradivarius comes on the market at Christie’s,
or if I want Luciano Pavarotti to sing Ave Maria at my wedding, competition
disappears. Where does the museum fit in all this? Do museum visitors
have so little discretionary time that the museum must compete for it
with ever bigger, ever flashier exhibitions? Are all museums somehow
equal, and therefore in competition? I would argue that the answer is
no on both counts.
The logic of competition holds
only if we imagine our visitors with a limited amount of time to spend,
and little chance to return—if we think our visitors are tourists. In
this case, the logic of the market prevails. If you only have three
days and eighty possible museums to choose from, even the casehardened
cultural tourist will be able to tackle no more than a dozen of them.
But does placing our emphasis on the occasional tourist visitor—at the
cost of treating the regular local user like a tourist—make sense? Does
it help us build better museums, richer informal learning environments,
activities that require engagement, commitment, and continuity? I would
argue strongly that as museum professionals we must stop thinking in
terms of visitors and instead think in terms of users—repeat visitors
who can learn the skills necessary to truly take advantage of the rich
environments we provide. Of course it is not a case of either/or; however,
for far too long the discourse has been dominated by those who see everything
in terms of the one-time, occasional visit.
There is a signal difference between
the cultures of Europe and North America in the discussion about competition.
In nearly all aspects of museum work, the dialogue has been shaped by
North American concerns, concerns arising largely from a pioneer culture,
which sees only individuals, at the expense of other forms of social
behavior. Competition is seen as a function of individual choices, and
between isolated institutions. But surely one of the lessons of museums
is that museum-going as a cultural practice is often as much social
as individual—people come to discuss their experiences, to compare notes,
to be with friends. It follows then that choices about museum-going
are often choices made with others—with family, friends, groups—which
makes it even more likely that it is the practice that is endorsed,
not the individual museum. Only if we are blinded by the rhetoric of
the marketplace, in which individual choices are made by individual
actors, can we make the mistake of thinking our museums truly compete
for their individual leisure time.
How Educational Is The Museum?
So if the museum is not to be defined
as part of the “leisure industry,” in which it would find itself playing—and
losing—by the rules of the entertainment market, where should it belong?
Museum expert Kenneth Hudson was intolerant of museums that shamelessly
took advantage of the generosity of the public purse by not taking seriously
their mission to serve the public. A museum had to be paid for—and money
didn’t just fall from the sky. “A museum has to have money in order
to survive. And where is that money going to come from? The money will
come, directly or indirectly, from the people who come to see the museums.”2
Or put another way, “It comes from the taxes paid by poor widows.”3
But if not entertainment, surely the museum can make a claim on the
widows’ taxes as a legitimate and traditional part of the national education
system.
One of the first public museums,
the Musée français, (later called the Musée du Louvre), was a creation
of the Convention of 1793, and was originally the repository of the
fruits of the confiscation of works of art from the church and the aristocracy
during the Revolution. Under the Directoire, the museum’s collections
were organized systematically according to “schools,” and most importantly,
explanatory texts were placed with each work of art. In addition to
explanatory texts, the Louvre, following its initial vocation as “the
people’s museum,” was open to the public free of charge, published a
guide for visitors and sold an inexpensive catalogue. The Muséum national
d’Histoire naturelle was created primarily from the Cabinet du roi and
the Jardin des plantes by the Convention of 1794. Lamarck was outspoken
about the needs of those who were excluded from the cabinets, and went
on to enunciate one of the fundamental principles of the modern museum:
public admission: “The museum should not only be open to the public
during the afternoon, that is to say during the hours when passers-by
and idle folk seek some relief from boredom, but during the morning
as well, that time of the day so particularly intended for travail,
above all in investigations relative to the sciences.”
Thus the arguments for founding
museums were linked to their ability to teach new skills, not just convey
information about the distant past or amuse idle time-wasters. Justifying
the creation of the Musée des arts et métiers, one of the first museums
of applied arts, the Abbé Gregoire summarized his proposal to the Convention
by saying “I have just disclosed to you the means of developing the
national industry.” The educational objectives of the Conservatory were
clear from the outset—faced with a substantial delay in catching up
with English industry, apprentices were to be routinely brought to the
Conservatory to study machines and working models of machines, in order
to speedily make up the French deficit in technology. Moreover, the
Conservatory became the depot of record for all inventions patented
in France, the repository of the history of France’s entry into the
industrial world. The Convention was convinced, and the Conservatoire
des arts et métiers in Paris was created on September 26th, 1794.
Since at least the heady days of
the Convention, the museum has had an explicit educational mission.
The museum was an integral part of social, cultural and economic policy,
and was intended to provide the opportunity for a broad public to participate
in the cultural capital of the growing state. The museum’s collections
were at once an act of preservation, and an investment in the future.
Adjuncts to the formal education system of schools and universities,
the museum’s collections were a resource to be used by students, scholars
and amateurs alike. In this respect, the nature of the museum’s educational
mission has not really changed significantly over the past centuries,
and the museum’s mission is still to excite, inspire and enlighten the
minds of its users.
What Education For Whom?
What has changed dramatically in
the post-war decades, however, are the assumptions about the nature
of the education that the museum is expected to provide, and the audience
to whom it will be provided. On the one hand, under pressure by interests
on both left and right of the political spectrum to increase access
to a much broader spectrum of society than that assumed by museum founders,
museums are increasingly confronted with visitors whose ability to take
advantage of the museum as an educational resource is limited. On the
other hand, however, in claiming to be an educational resource, rather
than a feature on the entertainment landscape, the museum is confronted
by a dilemma.
Can it remain haughty and aloof
from the obvious needs of its new visitors for new information—ever
the ivory tower? If so, how can it justify its generous subsidy from
the public purse? In many Western countries the government subsidy is
now tied directly to the museum’s ability to serve “under-served” audiences.
Or does it resign itself to accepting the role of offering remedial
education to those who are not able to enjoy the museum’s collections?
The shift in the museum’s educational priorities has been from supplementary
education, whereby the museum serving as a resource, to remedial education,
whereby the museum teaches the skills necessary to understand its collections.
Perhaps an illustration will help
understand the importance of this shift. Let us take the library as
our example. Its mission is relatively stable, and in many regards it
is similar to the traditional museum. The library collects, preserves,
studies and occasionally interprets its collections. Unlike the museum,
however, books are rarely displayed for the purpose of exhibition; instead,
it is expected that they be arranged and organized in order to help
those who can read them. People rarely go to a library just to look
around, nor do they exclaim “nice-looking books. I love books!”
The library is a different kind
of institution, but like the museum it supports learning about the world
and understanding the culture in which we live. In fact, many things
that one does in libraries we would love to have people doing in our
museums. But we have a very different model—libraries think in terms
of users, whereas museums most commonly conceive of their public in
terms of visitors. What would happen if the library responded to financial
and economic pressure in the same way as the museum in the past decades?
Imagine the following. A library
has low but stable numbers of users, a loyal group of locals who come
regularly to the library to read, browse and borrow. Under pressure
from the public administration to ensure greater accessibility and attract
new audiences, the library administration decides to put its books of
Greek poetry on display in a special exhibition, Greece having newly
joined the European Union. Visitors come, drawn by the rarity of the
books and their expensive bindings, richly tooled in gold and jewels.
Further exhibitions are mounted, featuring even costlier and more rare
books. Few visitors, however, read Greek.
The library’s education department
protests against the static book displays, unreadable by the majority
of the library’s new visitors, and develops new “hands-on” experiences
to introduce visitors to the basics of the Greek alphabet. Seeing the
success of the experiment (children drawing Greek-looking squiggles,
adults discussing olive oil), the library decides to create a new IMAX
theatre experience on the joys of Greek culture, necessitating the removal
of the library’s book collections. Given the crowds that come to the
IMAX theatre (designed by a famous Greek architect), the reading rooms
are closed to make way for visitor parking…4
Although rarely commented upon,
the shift in emphasis—and in mission—has important consequences. In
the library example above, instead of being a resource for users to
supplement their self-initiated and self-directed enquiries, it has
become a place for visitors to be entertained and (perhaps) instructed.
The library is no longer a place for readers; it is a place for non-readers.
On the one hand, if we accept that
the library (or museum) is a place for entertainment, for “flânerie,”
then there is no reason why the institution should not compete on its
own terms in the entertainment market. Why should it receive a subsidy
from the state? Or in Kenneth Hudson’s words, why should the institution
be financed from widows’ taxes?
On the other hand, if we argue
that the institution is a site for education in any meaningful sense,
then we are forced to weigh the costs of providing that education (both
in terms of one time capital costs and operating costs) and its effectiveness.
This is where the change in the nature of the educational experience
begins to matter. As a resource the library can be justified in terms
of its use to readers. However, as an instrument of remedial education—a
place in which one learns to read—it is clear that the few hours a year
spent in the library could in no way justify the large capital investment
and the high operating costs. It is even to be strongly doubted whether
the library could—or should—play such a role at all. With little effort,
it can be seen that the same argument applies to the museum.
The Cost Of Chasing Visitors
Notwithstanding
the importance of the “affective” or emotional impact of the museum
visit,5 several museum visitor
studies suggest that most museum visitors come three times in a lifetime6—as
a child (often in a school class), as a young parent, and as a grandparent.7
This general pattern is of course mitigated to some extent by what the
tourist industry calls VFF—Visiting Family and Friends—so when your
sister-in-law drops in with the kids, or your school chum passes through
town for the weekend, a trip to the museum might be the perfect way
to spend a rainy Sunday afternoon. While it is true that schoolchildren
often come more frequently, depending on the museum’s outreach programs,
these visits are often compulsory, and cannot be credited to the museum’s
attraction as an informal setting.
However, notwithstanding VFF, and
school visits, this three-visit pattern tends to force the museum to
create temporary exhibitions as a means of generating repeat visits.
In fact, the modern temporary exhibition is a creature born out of a
desire to increase the number of visitors. In the 70s the great “blockbuster”
exhibitions such as King Tut proved that the exhibition could be a major
money-earner, as well as a sure generator of extra visitors. However,
without change to generate repeat visits, or an influx of new visitors,
the number of visits inevitably declines. The museum’s allure is increasingly
that of a stadium—people visit only to see a specific event.
Paradoxically, however, increased
visitor numbers impair the ability to deliver the high quality engagement
that is at the heart of the museum experience. Large numbers of visitors
shorten and degrade every individual’s ability to engage with the exhibits,
and, when international tourists make up the bulk of the visitors, the
local community is squeezed out almost entirely.8
And, if the museum expands to meet the increased demand, it incurs increased
operating costs that only make the problem worse. The museum—an unwieldy
beast at best—ends up being unable to feed its increasingly heavy bulk.
To increase their earned revenue,
many museums have increased their reliance on tourist visits. The Louvre
estimates that over 70% of its visitors are international tourists,
the Van Gogh Museum, over 80%. But building a financial strategy on
one-time tourist visits comes at a high price—that of vulnerability.
During the IRA attacks in London in the 80s, tourist visits to London
museums plummeted, and the attacks on the World Trade Center on September
11th highlighted the vulnerability of the museum to shifts in tourist
behavior. Celestine Bohlen reported on the dramatic impact of September
11th on New York’s Guggenheim Museum.

The Guggenheim Museum, New York, NY
“Hard
times have come to the Guggenheim Museum on Fifth Avenue, and like the
good times before them, they have hit big. Admissions are down by almost
60 percent, revenue is running about half of what it is supposed to
be, and as of Friday 80 employees—roughly one-fifth of the staff—had
been given pink slips in what [the Guggenheim’s Director] Mr. Krens
described as the initial round of layoffs. Besides the staff cuts, which
reportedly may reach 40 percent, the museum has scaled back its exhibit
schedule, postponing exhibitions by Matthew Barney and Kasimir Malevich.
Its SoHo museum on Prince Street will close at the end of the year,
and the fate of its $20 million Web site, guggenheim.com, is still unclear.
…Ever the showman, Mr. Krens has now cast himself as a model of fiscal
responsibility. “I think it is appropriate for an institute to re-examine
its core mission,” he said. … But that has also made the Guggenheim
more vulnerable to the fickle tides of New York tourism. Of the museum’s
one million visitors a year, almost 70 percent are from out of town,
and 50 percent are from abroad, Mr. Krens said. In addition the Guggenheim
is more reliant than most museums on admission fees, which account for
25 percent of total revenue, compared with 12 percent at the Metropolitan
Museum of Art. Its critics see this as a weakness in his management
approach. “They were forced into being a cash machine,” said one director
of a New York museum who asked not to be identified because he did not
want to be seen as criticizing a rival.9
This is the crisis many museums
are now facing. Having built a financial strategy based on attracting
one-time visits—mostly tourists—by creating spectacular “blockbuster”
exhibitions, the museums have created an expectation of museum-visiting
that turns the museum into a stadium. As a consequence, the museum is
forced on the one hand to continue to mount expensive temporary exhibitions
that eclipse interest in their permanent collections, while on the other
hand they remain vulnerable to influences on visitor behavior—from changes
in taste to terrorist attacks. The core mission of the museum—to collect,
preserve, study, interpret and exhibit its own collections—is rendered
secondary to the imperatives of bringing in the crowds. The tail is
now wagging the dog.
Piazza Or Stadium?
We have seen above how the model
of the stadium—event-driven, one-time, short-term—acts in the long term
to reduce real use of the museum. What other models could we look to?
What other social spaces offer a model for repeat use by a broad spectrum
of the public?
From its earliest beginnings, the
model of the library has also been part of the museum’s history. In
many respects, the library model offers far more opportunities. A library
is local, rooted to its community of users—and global, in terms of the
resources it makes available. As a resource center, it can serve its
users in a wide variety of ways. A library is not exhausted by a visit;
on the contrary, it is refreshed by it. Europe also has a long tradition
of public places, and the model of the Italian piazza springs readily
to mind. A piazza is defined by the variety of possibilities it offers,
by the range of possible activities, and by its use by young and old.
The use of a piazza is entirely “bottom-up.” You can sit in the sun
and drink a coffee, talk to your friends, play with your grandchildren,
window shop—everything is possible in a piazza.

A piazza in Florence
Like the library and the piazza,
the museum always had an important social role. We know from the research
of Marilyn Hood10 and others
that for the majority of museum visitors, it is precisely this public
physical space that is one of the central motivations for visiting.
The majority of museum visitors come in groups, and the museum space
is not only a social space—a place where people meet and mingle—but
a socializing space, a place where they learn the skills of public interaction.
If the street is “a room by agreement,” as Louis Kahn once said,11
surely the museum is a house by agreement. A museum can also be seen—and
developed—as a special kind of piazza.
But to function as a piazza it
must also enlarge the range of activities it offers, and be prepared
to see the experience of its own collections as only a part of a social
activity that also includes eating, drinking, talking, and shopping.
The collections must be developed to create a sort of intellectual “park”
in which users can wander in a landscape of objects and ideas. Research
has amply demonstrated that the majority of museum visitors come for—and
remember best—the social interaction of the visit. It follows therefore
that a museum must strive to increase the number of opportunities for
a rich and varied social experience. The more a museum defines itself
as a piazza, the greater the number and the greater the variety of its
users.
The Numbers Game
But is the key to success—and its
measure—only to be found in increased visitor numbers? Unfortunately,
museums and their directors have often accepted uncritically the American
rhetoric about the museum mission, and, as a consequence, have accepted
the argument that the museum’s future depends on ever increasing visitor
numbers. Museums, Kenneth Hudson once said ruefully, “have become victims
of the equation, better = more, and they have adopted policies which
they believe could bring them the extra visitors which… their employers
are driving them to find. They dare not wonder whether going for popular
appeal will lessen or even destroy quality.”12
This new popularity—or at least increased visitor numbers—in turn depends
upon blockbuster exhibitions, and increasingly on new museum buildings.
Over the past three decades, museum buildings—not the museums and their
collections—have become the means by which museums compete with one
another for tourist visits.13
This logic is clearly spelled out in a recent article about the Victoria
and Albert Museum’s expansion plans in the New York Times. Here
it is suggested that the failing visitor numbers are the consequence
of the museum’s collections (the best in the world) and the remedy in
a new extension by a “signature architect.”
In 1991 the National Gallery
opened a new wing on Trafalgar Square. More recently, thanks to
profits from a national lottery, the Tate Modern rose out of a former
power plant on the Thames; the British Museum created a bright,
covered courtyard at its heart; and the National Portrait Gallery
was enlarged. Yet when the V&A sought lottery funds for a modern
extension designed by Daniel Libeskind, the architect of the acclaimed
Jewish Museum in Berlin, it was rebuffed. The V&A was in a funk.
A shortfall in government grants had forced it to start charging
entrance fees in 1996, but the resulting drop in attendance—to below
one million visitors a year—hurt its image. The modernization of
other museums also highlighted the antiquated presentation of its
eclectic collections. Further, as museums full of paintings drew
record crowds to blockbuster shows, it was clearer than ever that
decorative arts lacked the pulling power of, say, Rembrandt or Monet.14
The Tate Modern
In his article on the museum dilemma,
Alan Riding drives the point home:
Is it any wonder, by the way,
that museums therefore came to view architecture as a solution to
their problems? Architects naturally wanted to build the new cathedrals,
but museums wanted architects too, partly because just about the
only aspect of the museum over which institutional authority had
not yet totally eroded was the outside of the building. The popularity
of the Tate Modern last year proved that the impact of spectacular
architecture can pretty much drown out even the most substantial
complaints about exhibitions and collections. Bilbao has become
the ultimate dream of museum entrepreneurs. You don’t even need
a collection. You can borrow one. The goals are now civic luster
and economic improvement—decent goals but, aside from the aesthetics
of the building itself, not artistic ones. The hollow shell has
become an operative metaphor for newly skewed priorities.15
What is clear, however, is that
with certain notable exceptions such as the Centre Pompidou, the visitor
numbers generated by new buildings start to drop off after the third
year—the well–documented S-curve, and in the case of some museums, the
drop in visitor numbers can be vertiginous.16
At the same time, new buildings often bring substantially increased
operating costs in terms of overhead, maintenance, and staff. Increased
operating costs combined with drastically reduced visitor revenue can
injure —or even kill—a new institution,17
and paralyze an older one.18
Following its billion-dollar expansion, the Louvre, for example, is
forced to keep over 25% of its collections closed to the public due
to the high cost of extra staff.19

The Louvre
Nor is building new museums in
and of itself is the answer to revitalizing a city or a neighborhood.
A new museum building will bring visitors to an area on a one-time basis,
generating interest that generally peaks after three years, depending
on the size of the potential visitor pool. If the operational costs
of the museum are not adequately funded in the long term, new museum
building is urban suicide. Even the Bilbao effect—once a byword for
urban regeneration—will soon be a symbol of the failure of short term
urban planning. The once full flights are even now fewer, cancelled
for lack of interest in seeing the same exhibitions that the international
visitor has already seen in New York, Berlin or Venice. Those who wished
to see Gehry’s architectural wonder have largely done so. What will
remain is a forlorn outpost of the McGuggenheim, its titanium petals
rusting in the Spanish sun, its exhibition halls empty.20
The museum I recently directed
is a good example of the short-sightedness of museum building without
considering its long-term sustainability. For the first few years, the
Museum für Kunsthandwerk (as it was called from 1935–2000) basked in
the sun of public attention due to its world-renowned Richard Meier
architecture. The visitors came in droves, from both Frankfurt and abroad,
largely to see the new building—an architectural landmark. The Director
responsible for guiding Meier’s work retired in 1987. By 1989, with
the only change being in the form of temporary exhibitions, visitor
numbers had fallen predictably (following the S-curve), although the
quality of the Museum’s exhibitions continued to draw a loyal local
following.
Unfortunately, in 1994, the City
began to feel the pinch of their generous support of the cultural sector
(at its peak, Frankfurt’s cultural budget exceeded the cultural budget
for all of Holland). Abruptly the money supply was turned off. Exhibition
projects went unfunded, positions went unfilled, building maintenance
went undone. For the first time, Frankfurt’s museums had to charge admission,
but this brought in no more than 10% of the amount slashed from the
budget, and as a consequence the visitor numbers halved again. Not surprisingly,
given the double impact of diminishing value and increased prices, visitor
numbers plummeted. To this date, the museum has no City budget for exhibitions,
education, publications, or publicity.21
Building A Time Bomb
Unfortunately, the tyranny of the
S-curve means regular crises due to the novelty wearing off. Exhibitions
create an S-curve in the year’s visitor patterns, and a new building
creates a longer-term problem. The truth appears to be that the market
for new museums is largely saturated, and new buildings only temporarily
mask an overall decline in museum use. Despite rising wages and standard
of living, which continue to swell the ranks of the middle classes able
to afford museum visits, the pool of regular museum visitors seems to
be growing slowly if at all. Moreover, despite the large numbers of
visitors, they are not spread equally over all museums, but tend to
favor the larger museums located in major tourist meccas. Even they
are not exempt, as Alan Riding reported,
…[A] report by the Cour des
Comptes, France’s equivalent of the General Accounting Office, painted
a still darker picture of the Louvre’s management problems. The
report, which is still unpublished, was leaked to a newspaper. Although
it covered 1993–2000, it described a situation—financial difficulties,
gallery closings and lack of autonomy—that was aggravated last year
by a strike that closed the museum for three weeks and by a drop
in tourism after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The number
of visitors to the museum fell to 5.2 million last year from 6 million
in 2000. Some of the museum’s problems are actually the results
of success. The $1.1 billion spent by the government over the last
15 years on building I. M. Pei’s glass pyramid for the museum and
on expanding and renovating gallery space more than doubled the
Louvre’s number of annual visitors. But the museum’s budget, staff
and management structure did not keep up.22
Operating costs are at the heart
of the museum time bomb. The capital costs of new buildings are substantial,
and it is a rare project that is not over budget. These costs, however,
are normally paid for by one-time contributions from private donors,
sponsors, or the state. In Britain, dozens of projects have been financed
in the past years by means of the Lottery Fund. However, large buildings
require larger staff, and incur substantially higher operating costs.
These costs are rarely, if ever, taken into consideration by private
or civic funders—on the contrary, the Lottery Fund expressly excludes
operating subsidies from its grants.
This means that institutions are
required to demonstrate that the increased operating costs will be paid
for by revenue. Most new institutions (and many older ones) argue optimistically
that this increased revenue will be supplied by the increased visitor
numbers that stream into the newly built institution. Unfortunately,
museum work suffers from “Baumol’s disease,” whereby increased use of
technology does not bring with it a corresponding increase in productivity.
This means that as wages increase to keep up with inflation, the museum’s
operating costs become inexorably more expensive. This is not a case
of public sector inefficiency, just economics (most public sector work
is afflicted).
As seen from the above, the evidence
is less than encouraging. After the initial burst of popularity, visitor
numbers inevitably decline, leaving the new institution starved for
the cash desperately needed to renew facilities and attract new revenue.
At best, the institution can limp along for a few years. At worst, the
institution faces bankruptcy. In both cases the state is faced with
the prospect of either refinancing the institution, or letting it go
bust. In the first instance, this means an extra burden on the state’s
finances, which are already under pressure from an ageing population,
high unemployment and the need to renew the ageing infrastructure. In
the second instance, bankruptcy is seen as throwing away a substantial
investment. In reality, the course commonly adopted is to provide an
additional injection of one-time funds conditional on becoming self-sufficient
in a given time frame. All this does, however, is to emasculate the
institution further, and push it further away from its initial mission.
In either case, what remains is a building; another monument to short-sighted
planning.
Based on the American experience,
Michael Kimmerman puts the danger of the dilution of the museum’s mission
succinctly:
In the way that politics frequently
works, left and right have met around these issues of populism and
spectacle. As usual, both sides claimed to speak for the people,
while condescending to them. Conservatives argued that museums ought
to support themselves and not beg from taxpayers, unless museums
could be more demonstrably responsive, and responsible, to the broadest
public. It was de facto populism, not leftist populism, with the
left’s stress on diversity, and it resulted in the equivalent of
Grandma Moses exhibitions to cater to so-called popular taste and
American values. If it didn’t mean more of those shows, it meant
market-driven initiatives: more anodyne Impressionism extravaganzas,
displays about Jacqueline Onassis at the Metropolitan, and Steve
Wynn’s profitable art gallery in the lobby of his Bellagio Hotel
in Las Vegas, a marketing coup, which set the stage for the Guggenheim
and Hermitage’s opening a joint museum across the strip at the Venetian
Hotel in October.23
At the same time, arguments for
the museum’s educational mission, while valid, seem out of proportion
to the enormous costs of new building and large staff. With inner-city
schools under-funded, it is difficult to justify a new museum with even
the most ambitious educational outreach programs on the basis of twice-yearly
visits to the museum.
Are Museums Sustainable?
Today’s museums are in a quandary.
On the one hand, if they are to compete against other “leisure activities”
they are at a disadvantage due to high capital costs, high operating
costs and often inflexible management structures. Few if any museums
are 100% revenue financed, and there is little evidence that in the
free market visitors would be prepared to pay the true value of providing
even the best “blockbuster” exhibitions if all the costs were factored
in. On the other hand, if museums are to be financed from the public
purse, they must demonstrate their value in terms of providing educational
opportunities for those identified by the state as key target audiences.
This too is problematic, given the high costs of the museum and the
relatively little time any visitor spends.
Museum directors are justifiably
confused by what they see as a choice between two equally untenable
alternatives. As Michael Kimmerman wrote in the New York Times
after the Salzburg Conference in 2001: “But what else would you expect?
As Mr. Harris put it: ‘Museum directors could legitimately claim bewilderment
at being told, simultaneously, to avoid the public trough and stand
on their own two feet, but not to resemble too closely the commercial
world that, after all, had to show a profit.’ ”
The new populism has increased
the mythology of attendance. How do museums prove their worthiness to
corporate and government sponsors today? By drawing more people through
the turnstiles, and more kinds of people. Those with the purse strings
demand it. Peter Weibl, the director of a museum in Graz, Austria, specializing
in electronic art, talked at the seminar about the illogic of this concept.
Attendance is considered a measure of public service by funders, government
funders especially, who, without thinking the issue through, simply
figure that the more people who visit museums, the more public-minded
the museums must be, never mind that attendance has nothing necessarily
to do with enlightenment. Museums, having therefore been instructed
that success is to be measured by attendance numbers, then organize
Monet and van Gogh shows, which guarantee big box-office returns, so
they can declare themselves successful. The tautology is absurd.
The question should not be how
many people visit museums but how valuable are their visits. Attendance
at a museum is different from attendance at a ballpark or a movie. Partly
the difference is that baseball and Hollywood are for-profit businesses
while museums are educational institutions, although the more people
the merrier at museums; to borrow a useful turn of phrase, museums are
equal-opportunity elitists. But museums have not yet learned how to
measure precisely the quality of the experience they offer—what their
visitors are getting out of their visits aside from gifts in the gift
shop and sandwiches in the cafeteria. The Getty Trust sponsored some
expensive interviews in the 1990s, asking what visitors liked about
museums, which displays they found instructive, what kinds of promotion
worked better than others. But those were preliminary studies. Time
and again in Salzburg, curators and directors talked about the need
to boost attendance, which was almost all the time, the question that
hung in the air was, “money aside, to what end?”24
It is clearly time to “bell the
cat” and declare that in their present form, most museums are not sustainable.25
The museum market is over-saturated, the operating costs are high relative
to earned revenue, and productivity (however defined) cannot be enhanced
by one-time infusions of technology. Most vulnerable are middle-aged,
middle-sized institutions that are unable to generate sufficient operating
revenue to remain attractive to the visiting public, thus slowly suffocating
for lack of visitors and funding. As long as public funding continues
to decrease—a likely scenario given the increasing demands on the public
purse and decreasing revenue—museums must face a future where their
survival depends on earned revenue.
It is clear that the worldwide
trend is away from state support for the museum sector, a defection
that will soon turn into a rout due to the demands on the public purse
of an ageing population. So is the answer to privatize? If so, what
does such a privatization mean? Recently the Italian government announced
plans to privatize its museums, although what it meant was not spelled
out. Melinda Henneberger writes “Mr. Berger, who was in charge of merchandising
at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, was hired as a consultant
here in 1993 to bring modern marketing techniques to Italy. […] He said
the partial privatization was no threat to Italian art: ‘Private isn’t
only General Motors. And American museums are private not-for-profit
already. In Britain it’s a mix of private and public, and in France
it’s run by the state. The Italian way will help alleviate a burden
the state just can’t handle any more.’ ”26
As Berger notes above, there is
a range of models to choose from, from wholly private, earned revenue-financed
museums to not-for-profit foundations fully supported by an endowment.
What is clear, however, is that without breaking free from its dependence
on public sector funding, many medium-sized museums are doomed to eventual
extinction. On the other hand, the vagaries of the market mean that
total reliance on earned revenue or private funding is also an extremely
shaky foundation on which to build the museum’s future.
The solution, it would seem from
the American experience, lies in a form of the endowment fund—investments
in stocks, bonds or real estate that bring a return on investment that
can be used to support the museum’s activities. This fund can be created
by private patronage or public munificence. In fact, to be sustainable,
it is imperative that the museum’s funding streams always remain diversified—earned
revenue, sponsorship, private donations, grants from all levels of government,
European, national, provincial and municipal. What is essential is that
the fund (or foundation) be autonomous, and that its revenue, however
meager, not be at risk from the vagaries of further private or public
decisions. Even an endowment fund has inherent risks. The market may
underperform, meaning that the revenue from the endowment is reduced
from one year to the next. Even more dangerous is the practice of withdrawing
money from the endowment to pay for operating costs—a practice usually
strongly discouraged by the endowment’s board.
Nevertheless, some museums succumb
to the temptation. In the case of the Guggenheim, “the museum’s endowment
has declined in recent years, from $55.6 million in 1998, to $38.9 million
at the end of 2001. An endowment consists of savings that produce interest
and should not be spent. While donors have continued to write checks
to the Guggenheim’s endowment, Krens has regularly dipped into it, mainly
to cover operating expenses.”27
This may have appeared an acceptable risk in the heady boom times of
the 1990s; in the bear market of the first years of the 21st century,
it appears to be suicidal folly.
The Future Of Museums
The future of museums looks grim.
The museum is overdrawn, and it is not clear where the much-needed revenue
should come from. Forced into a market where it cannot compete, the
museum is forced to overtrade, using scarce resources to chase after
a dismayingly wide range of possible revenue sources. Seduced into thinking
that bigger is better and that growth is the key to health, the museum
is overcrowded, thus destroying the very essence of the museum experience,
and undermining the ability to use the museum to bring visitors into
contact with masterpieces of culture. So what is the future of our museums?
If they cannot survive from earned revenue, nor depend any longer on
public funding, how should our institutions respond? I would argue that
the answer is a mix of several strategies.
First, museums must scale down
their ambitions and resist the temptation to confuse growth with health.
By restricting its activities to its “core business,” operating costs
can also be substantially reduced. Many medium-sized municipal museums
remain under-visited—large warehouses of city treasures, poorly maintained
and understaffed. Often these same museums pay a large premium just
to keep the doors open to snag the few hundred visitors who might wander
in on a rainy weekday. But must all museums be open to all the public
all the time? Certain museums with a specialist public, rather than
chasing increased visitor numbers to cover high operating costs, might
do well to consider being open on an appointment only basis, or one
day a week. Many cities were caught up in the museum-building frenzy
of the 1980s and 90s, vying to outdo one another with potlatch-like
displays of municipal largesse. In the lean years of the early 21st
century, perhaps some of these museums can be consolidated, their collections
joined with the consequence of greater rotation and greater perceived
change? In the museum “market,” surely some museums should be allowed
to swallow others, while still others become extinct?
Second, the museum must aim at
achieving institutional independence, and to ensuring its long term
financial health based on an endowed Foundation model, supported by
a mix of sources, without becoming dependent on any single revenue stream.
Whether a small community museum or a large tourist destination, the
museum can survive only as long as it is managed as an autonomous whole.
This means that all the key factors on which the museum stands or falls—an
articulated vision, a motivated staff, and a sustainable financial strategy—must
be able coordinated within a single, coherent, transparent administrative
framework. Museums where the administration is separated from the leadership,
where financial decisions are taken independently from personnel decisions,
where political influences shape the policies the museum must adopt—are
destined to be structurally weak, ineffective, and fraught with inevitable
conflicts of interest.28 Even
the Louvre is not exempt—“in a recent interview with the weekly magazine
L’Express, Mr. Loyrette said the financial squeeze had forced
him to cut his conservation budget by 25 percent and to cancel or postpone
several temporary exhibitions. […] Mr. Loyrette told Le Monde
that he ‘very largely shared’ the conclusions of the Cour des Comptes
[highly critical of the Louvre’s dependence on the French Ministry of
Culture]. ‘The difficulties described in the report are all the more
explicable because they are structural,’ he said. ‘They are a product
of the tutelage exercised over the Louvre.’ ”29
The importance of operational autonomy and a transparent decision-making
structure cannot be underestimated as a key factor in the museum’s to
ability respond flexibly to change. Moreover, the better managed the
museum, the more likely that it can fulfill the promises it makes to
the many stakeholders necessary to support the museum’s activities.
Third, the museum should return
to a focus on its core values—Veach’s “five fingers”—in the interests
of generating a slowly growing base of users, not onetime visitors.
It should look to the library—or the piazza—to provide a model of use,
not just one-time visits. In the ecology of museums, each museum should
be encouraged to find its “niche.” Those who have well-trained and motivated
educational staff should use them to advantage to create programs for
the schools, those over-stocked with scholars should research and publish.
Kenneth Hudson always argued that the museum was in fact more like a
private club than a disco, and that its ambitions should remain modest,
and its financial health based on its membership base—its users. I would
also argue that a museum’s future is also based on its specificity—its
collections. Like a library, a museum is a resource, which should serve
a broad base of interested and informed users. Like a piazza, it is
a place that should sustain the broadest possible range of activities
related to the experience and enjoyment of the museum’s collections.
As Michael Kimmerman wrote recently
in the New York Times,
[The museum’s] priorities
need restating. They are neither universities nor Disneyland. […]
But beyond leisure and entertainment, our perception of a museum,
and its moral value, still has to do with our desire for sacred
space, even if we are reluctant to put it that way. Museums exist
to offer us something that we can’t find anywhere else: an encounter,
whether with an object or idea (or even with something on the Internet
if we consider virtual museums)—an encounter we deem true and authentic
in a place respectful of this private transaction. Otherwise, museums
are just fancy storage facilities and gift shops.
This sounds obvious but evidently isn’t.
It entails less equivocation, less democracy, less blurring of the line
between commerce and content, and a reassertion of authority on the
part of museums, which must restate their convictions about esoteric
beauty, the ethical import of aesthetics and the special, if intangible,
power of the things they possess. The goal is not for every museum to
become another Frick. It is to use the excellent new tools available—technological,
didactic—to become more effective and more affecting places. Between
the university and Disneyland is not a morass of compromise but a realm
of rational entertainment, a concept harking back to the Enlightenment.
Rational entertainment requires a standard of quality on the part of
museums. Quality has become a dirty word, an antidemocratic concept,
according to museum critics, but quality, and the ability to explain
it eloquently, are still what separate museums from shopping malls.
Museums need to reclaim the idea of quality because it is what people
want when they go to museums: to be told what they should value, so
that they can then decide for themselves whether or not to agree—which
is how a free democracy really works. Standards change, values evolve,
but without them at any given moment, we are lost.30
The museum must return to its core
values, and deliver on its core skills. The museum must be home to collections
and to learning from those collections. The museum ‘is a place where
one learns that the life of the mind is a pleasure’ in the words of
Jonathan Miller, ‘an institution for the prevention of blindness’ according
to Nelson Goodman, ‘a permanent storage battery’ for Sherman Lee. The
museum must look towards the creation of ‘lightweight,’ flexible projects
that take advantage of the museum’s unique collections, not heavyweight
blockbusters that disrupt the priorities of the museum and distort the
identity of the museum. In the future, the museum must return to being
a learning hub—not a ‘destination attraction.’ Then, and only then,
will museums be sustainable and remain a vital societal resource—a multi-facetted
piazza for the learning society.
Notes
-
Joseph Veach
Noble, “Museum Manifesto.” Address to the American Association of
Museums, 1970.
- Kenneth Hudson, “The Public Quality
of a Museum,” Les cahiers d’étude, Nr. 6, pp. 3-5, ICOM, Paris,
1999.
- op.cit
- Since the time of writing (January
2002), the analogy used has taken on a prescient cast: “as part of preparations
for its role as European Capital of Culture 2008, Liverpool plans to
spend £35m converting its historic Central Library into what it calls
a ‘Discovery Centre.’ Fine… but don’t ask about the books. Five floors
of the building will be ripped out to create a spacious new entrance,
a visitor center with café, a huge gallery space and a room containing
500 shiny new computers. Curiously, the three pages of effusive press
release about the scheme don’t mention the word books once. What
a way to celebrate European culture.” Private Eye, No. 1096,
December 26, 2003–January 8, 2004, p.27.
- Many studies bear out the importance
of the emotional, or “hearts-on” character of the museum visit, which
stems in large part from its social nature, undertaken with family and
friends.
- This is of course a broad generalization,
and discounts the confounding effect of temporary exhibitions, special
programs, multiple school visits (which are formal, rather than informal),
and VFF, all which serving to mask the three peaks.
- It could be argued that the fact
that the museum visit is most often an emotionally-charged, social occasion
in the company of family and friends accounts in large measure for the
observed frequency, and that even repeat visits based on this affective
charge merely reinforce the pattern of visits.
- As an example, in 1997, over
85% of the visitors to the Van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam were foreign
tourists.
- Celestine Bohlen in the New
York Times, November 20, 2001, “The Guggenheim’s Scaled-Back Ambition.”
- Hood has written extensively
on the pyschographics of museum visiting. See Hood, M. “Leisure Preferences
are the key to science centre audience research,” unpublished paper,
Vantaa: World Science Centre Congress, 1996.
- From Louis Kahn’s notebooks,
quoted in Lobell, J. Between Silence and Light, Shambala: Boston,
1979.
- Kenneth Hudson, “The Right and
Wrong Road for Museums,” op.cit.
- Thomas Krens in the New York
Times, June 30, 2002, “Is the Go-Go Guggenheim Going, Going...”
by Deborah Solomon. “It’s easier to raise money for a building than
a show. […] A building is permanent.”
- Alan Riding in the New York
Times, December 5, 2001, “A Stodgy Museum Spruces Up.”
- Michael Kimmerman in the New
York Times, August 26, 2001, “Museums in a Quandary: Where Are the
Ideals?”
- For instance at the Rotterdam
Kunsthalle.
- For instance the Discovery Center
in Baltimore, which closed after a year due to low attendance
- For instance Frankfurt’s Museum
für Kunsthandwek, which saw visitor numbers of over 350,000 in 1986
fall to a more or less stable base of 85,000 by 1996.
- Henri Loyrette in Le novel
observateur, March 28, 2002, “Les musées en crise” pp. 64-65.
- McGuggenheim is not the
only metaphor used to describe Thomas Kren’s vision. The critic Jerry
Saltz, writing recently in The Village Voice, called for Krens’s
resignation and went on to say, “The trustees and board members who
helped him twist this institution into a kind of GuggEnron should go
as well.”
- Since the time of writing, the
author has resigned from his position as Director of the Museum for
Applied Art in Frankfurt. Since January 2003, he has been Director of
the Next Generation Foundation, based in London, England.
- Alan Riding in the New York
Times, January 30, 2002, “French Government and the Louvre in a
War of Words.”
- Michael Kimmerman in the New
York Times, August 26, 2001, “Museums in a Quandary: Where Are the
Ideals?”
- Michael Kimmerman in the New
York Times, August 26, 2001, “Museums in a Quandary: Where Are the
Ideals?”
- The exception is large museums
situated in major tourist destinations, which can mitigate the effects
of the S-curve by the sheer volume of new tourists resulting from the
coming of age of each new generation of cultural tourists—as long as
unexpected events like the attacks on the World Trade Center do not
disrupt travel practices. Small museums—“museums with charm and museums
with chairs” in the words of Kenneth Hudson, are also likely to survive.
Unburdened by high operating and maintenance costs, they can respond
more flexibly to changes to the funding landscape.
- Melinda Henneberger in the New
York Times, December 3, 2001, “Italy Plans to Have Private Sector
Run Museums.”
- Deborah Solomon, “Is the Go-Go
Guggenheim Going, Going…” in the New York Times, June 30, 2002
- op.cit Alan Riding in the New
York Times, January 30, 2002, “French Government and the Louvre
in a War of Words:” The report of the Cour des Comptes noted that the
autonomy promised to the Louvre in 1993 was to date “largely fictitious”
because the museum still had to answer to two Culture Ministry departments,
the Reunion of National Museums, which oversees 33 government-owned
museums, and the Direction of French Museums, which fixes government
subsidies to museums. The government currently provides 70 percent of
the Louvre’s $110 million annual budget. The report also took the Louvre’s
side in a long-running dispute with one of those departments. As part
of a government policy of sharing revenues from ticket sales at the
Louvre and the Palace of Versailles with smaller museums, the Louvre
gives more than $9 million a year to the Reunion of National Museums
and receives only $4 million in return. The report said this diversion
of funds prevented the museum from fulfilling its functions.
- op.cit Alan Riding in the New
York Times, January 30, 2002
- Michael Kimmerman in the New
York Times, August 26, 2001, “Museums in a Quandary: Where Are the
Ideals?”
Dr. James M. Bradburne, AADipl
MCSD, was formerly Director General of Museum für Angewandte Kunst,
Frankfurt am Main, Germany. He currently is Director of The Next Generation
Foundation, based in Slough, Berkshire, UK. He may be reached at jamesb@xs4all.nl.
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